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"Billy, listen to me, white men cant jump."
Sydney Deane
1 Introduction
Beliefs shaped by psychological dispositions and social norms or interactions are commonly recog-
nized as important determinants of economic decision making and market outcomes. Becker (1957)
and Arrow (1972) provide models depicting such beliefs in the context of discrimination while Ak-
erlof (1980) and Romer (1984) study the persistence of customs. Most of the evidence on the
e¤ects of beliefs formed upon a psychological and social basis, or "biases", comes from the studies
aiming to detect discrimination in labor markets (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), in access
to services (e.g., Page, 1995) and in access to resources, most notably credit (e.g., Munnell et al.,
1996; Pope and Sydnor, 2011). A related literature documents systematic deviations from standard
assumptions underlying economic behavior and links them to psychological and social factors (see
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin, 2004, and DellaVigna, 2009, for a review). Challenges remain in
both strands of the literature: documenting whether discrimination exists rather than the observed
di¤erences stemming from unobserved heterogeneity, distinguishing information-based discrimina-
tion from taste-based discrimination, and understanding whether and how behavioral biases carry
over from laboratory experiments to real markets as well as whether and how they persist instead
of market forces eliminating such biases.
This paper o¤ers new insights into these challenges by studying the e¤ects of psychologically-
based, socially-reinforced beliefs in a nancial market setting. In particular, we examine the re-
lationship between National Basketball Association (NBA) betting outcomes and the race of the
participants in order to uncover how biases originating from psychological dispositions and social
norms a¤ect market outcomes. This is an ideal setting to expand our knowledge on the economics
of biases for several reasons.
First, the NBA betting markets provide advantages that other settings, including other nancial
market settings, cannot. Specically, bettors pay for their biased tastes à la Becker. Hence,
decisions based on mistaken beliefs are punished with direct pecuniary losses. This is in contrast
to studies of the impact of beliefs in psychology and sociology literatures, where most evidence rely
on experiments or surveys with no immediate, explicit, pecuniary gains or losses for the subjects.
In addition, unlike most nancial markets, the sports betting markets contain well-dened prices,
well-dened outcomes, readily accessible information, and a nite time horizon. Therefore, usual
caveats associated with measurement problems (e.g., dening the horizon over which returns should
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be measured) and asymmetric information do not apply. Moreover, the actions and outcomes are
repeated with a signicant degree of frequency, providing an opportunity to test whether the impact
of biases persists or disappears as market participants learn about the bias and compete to grasp
arbitrage opportunities.
Second, the beliefs in the market we study are easily recognized since some of the most deeply
held ideas about race and racial di¤erence are expressed in our beliefs about sports and athletic
ability, creating one of the most well-known stereotypes: the natural black athlete, and especially,
the black basketball star. The common perception that black people are better at basketball than
people of other races and/or ethnicities is so evident that the term "the black game" was coined to
refer to the sport (George, 1999). What makes it so di¢ cult to counter the argument that blacks
have an innate ability to play basketball is that there appears to be evidence to support it: roughly
70% of NBA players are black. As a result, the idea that blacks are better basketball players and
the evidence that seemingly supports this idea can have far-reaching consequences. For economists,
an interesting question arises when these observations become unwavering, subconscious attitudes
that support the mistaken belief that athletic ability is inextricably tied to race and these attitudes
a¤ect economic decision making in a predictable manner, thus challenging the rationality tenet in
its standard form.
Hence, in our setting, market outcomes are objective, common knowledge, determined within a
nite time, and repeated regularly, and there exists a widely-familiar, biased view of the participants.
Our data consists of the outcomes of NBA games and the Las Vegas point spreads on these games,
from the 1993-94 season through the 2007-08 season.1 Betting on NBA basketball generally involves
a point spread wager, where the bet wins based on the relationship between the nal score and the
point spread. To illustrate, if the spread is +3.5 for the home team, an $11 bet on the home team
would pay $21 if either the home team won the game or they lost by 3 points or less. An $11 bet
on the visiting team would pay $21 only if the visiting team won by 4 points or more. In this
setting, the point spread is a market-based estimate of the actual margin at the end of the game.
Our analysis provides evidence that biases embodied as stereotypes about the relative ability of
a certain group of players have an impact on nancial decisions by examining how the point spread
and the performance against the spread in NBA betting markets varies with the racial composition
of the teams. We ask whether the belief that black players are better than their white counterparts
a¤ects the point spread and hence the likelihood of beating the spread. In other words, do "more
black" basketball teams look better than "less black" teams in the sense that, all things equal,
1Note that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA) imposes a federal ban on
sports betting in all states with the exception of Delaware, Nevada, Montana, and Oregon. These four states already
had sports betting laws on their books when the Congress passed PASPA and were permitted to o¤er parlay-type
sports betting. Nevada, however, exclusively allows all types of sports betting, statewide, on any professional or
amateur sports games, in any capacity.
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bettors are more inclined to bet on the former? If this is the case, then the spread on a more black
team will be higher than it should be, leading to a negative relationship between the fraction of
black players and the performance against the spread.
We nd that the point spreads are higher for teams with a relatively higher fraction of black
players. We also nd that the probability of beating the spread decreases as the fraction of black
players increases. Our results are robust to alternate measures of the racial composition of the
team: the number of black players starting the game, the number of black players on the full roster,
and the minutes played by black players.
One important assumption in interpreting the nding that it is less likely for black teams to
beat the spread concerns the e¢ ciency of NBA betting markets. In other words, it is implicitly
assumed that the spread incorporates all relevant and available information about the game. We
conrm that this is indeed the case, by showing that the actual margin minus the spread is normally
distributed with a mean of zero. Hence, unconditionally, any game has an equal probability of
ending up with a score on either side of the spread.
Further, the notion that the ability di¤erence is indeed a bias (or stereotype), and is not real, is
conrmed by the empirical observation that performance measures for black and white players are
not statistically di¤erent. In fact, white players tend to be taller and more e¢ cient in the sense
that they score almost the same points as black players despite playing fewer minutes. However,
there is no signicant di¤erence in terms of scoring ability between black players and their white
counterparts. Similarly, there is no evidence of a robust relationship between the relative blackness
of a team and its chances of winning the game. Hence, even in the absence of statistical evidence
supporting the belief that black players are better, the bias exists and a¤ects decisions made by
agents.
There are two hypotheses for the cause of the relationship between race and the point spread.
It could be that biased bettors place more money on the more black team, thus causing the spread
to move from an unbiased spread to a biased spread. Or it could be the case that the bookmakers
are aware of the bias of bettors, and set the spread in order to extract more surplus. Why would
bookmakers set a biased spread? Levitt (2004) shows that bookmakers can increase their earnings
if bettors have a bias. This is because the bookmakers can set the point spread in a manner such
that more than half of the money is bet on the outcome which wins less than half of the time. In
order to distinguish between these hypotheses, we use a second data set containing the opening and
closing lines, for the 2003-04 season through the 2009-10 season.
Our results show that the opening spread does not move at all a quarter of the time and the
di¤erence between the closing and opening lines is normally distributed around zero. Moreover,
the movement of the spread is not related to the racial composition of the teams in a statistically
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signicant and robust manner. Hence, it appears to be the case that the bookmakers know of
the bias towards more black teams and consider this when they set the spread. This is further
supported by evidence that more money is bet on the more black team.
To gain intuition on our results, consider two teams which are exactly as good as each other,
consequently each team will win with a probability of 0.5. However, one team is more blackthan
the other. Therefore, some people will have a bias that the black team is better and deem their
probability of winning to be greater than 0.5, even though the truthis 0.5. To exploit this bias,
rather than setting the spread as a pick-em (spread of 0), the bookmaker sets the spread in favor
of the black team at a value di¤erent than 0. This means that (all things equal) the black team
will cover the spread with a probability less than 0.5, making this a worse bet. This reasoning still
holds when the teams are not as good as each other. In this case, there is a true spreadwhich
each team will cover with probability 0.5. But the bookmakers do not set the spread at the true
spread but rather the true spread adjusted by a few points for the black team. Again, the black
team covers with probability less than 0.5.
Let us return to the case where both teams are equally good, so the expected nal margin is
zero. Further, let us assume that the spread at which an even amount of money would be placed
both sides of the bet would be -3 for the more black team. In this case, since half of the money is
on either side of the bet, the bookmakersexpected payo¤ is determined exclusively by the betting
cost: for every $11 bet, the winner gets $21, that is, a return of $10 and not $11. Similarly if the
spread is set at 0, the bookmakersexpected payo¤ is again determined exclusively by the betting
cost.2 The prot-maximizing spread is somewhere between 0 and -3. So, the bookmakers set the
spread at, say, -2 and more money is bet on the black team because bettors think the spread should
be -3. Since more than half of the money is bet on the outcome which occurs less than half the
time, the bookmakers earn extra prots.
Our results imply that biases can indeed inuence behavior in nancial settings. Hence, we
contribute to the literature by providing evidence that economic decision making is altered by
conscious or subconscious categorization based on observable characteristics, e.g., race and gender.
Additionally, the association between the point spread ("the price") and the racial composition of
the teams (a variable that is not systematically related to the winning ability of a team and is
observable prior to the bets being placed) creates protable opportunities that involve betting on
the "whiter" team. In other words, the bias is su¢ ciently large and persistent that we are able
to identify a means of proting from the biased market outcomes. Moreover, our ndings are
consistent with such biases being more likely to stem from information-based motives than from
taste-based motives. This is because the bookmakers seem to incorporate these biases into prices
2For more on this, see Levitt (2004).
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and there is no reason to expect these particular agents to be of a di¤erent racial composition than
the others. Also, if one presumes that bettors from a particular geographical region would be
more inclined to bet on the team based in their region and the racial prole of bettors resembles the
demographics of the region, then preference-based explanations would imply a negative relationship
between the "black cities" and the probability of the more black home teams beating the spread.
We do not, however, nd evidence of such a relationship.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literatures on
discrimination and nancial markets, including sports betting. Section 3 provides an overview of
the data. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. The rst of these strands examines biases
and their impact on economic outcomes. A large number of studies look at discrimination, i.e.,
where outcomes depend on characteristics such as gender and race. Because of the ine¢ ciencies
discrimination may create and potential policy implications, it is of great interest to identify settings
in which biases exist and, once they are identied, to specify the mechanism which is causing the
bias.3 Often, it is very di¢ cult to nd unambiguous evidence of biased outcomes, mostly due to the
omitted variables problem. That is, ruling out the possibility that the observed variation may be a
consequence of unobserved heterogeneity, which is also correlated with the object of study (in many
cases, gender or race), is a di¢ cult task. In response to this problem, some researchers have used
audit studies whereby the investigators send identical treatments into the eld, with exception that
they di¤er on the basis of, say, race. Then the researchers seek to observe di¤erences in behavior or
outcome on the basis of race. For instance, in their inuential study, Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004) sent otherwise identical resumes to potential employers, where some applicants had white
names and some had blacknames. The authors found that applicants with black names were
less likely to receive a callback for an interview than were the applicants with white names. Audit
studies, such as this one, have proven to be useful in identifying biased settings (see, e.g., Ayers
and Siegelman, 1995, for another example of this type of technique). There are however, some
drawbacks with audit studies.4 First, it is argued (Heckman, 1998) that these studies overstate the
e¤ect of discrimination because they do not account for the e¤ects of the unbiased people on the
market outcomes. In other words, these audit studies can identify that some behave in a biased
fashion, however it is possible that the unbiased people can behave in a way which mitigates the
3For more on discrimination literature, see, among others, Altonji and Blank, 1999, Ross and Yinger, 2002, and
Charles and Guryan, 2008.
4For more on the di¢ culties with audit studies, see Yinger (1998).
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e¤ects of the behavior of the biased people. Our paper is not vulnerable to this criticism because
the object of our study is not individual behavior but rather market outcomes and we nd that the
market outcomes are biased. Second, to our knowledge, audit studies are not repeated whereby
the decision maker can learn about the unobserved heterogeneity of the subject. Again, we are not
vulnerable to this objection because we have a considerable number of observations for the same
players and teams, whereby the e¤ects of the unobserved heterogeneity could be learned. Therefore,
we nd that the market is persistently biased even with the opportunity to learn otherwise, and
even though there are pecuniary costs to behaving based on these mistaken beliefs.
The phenomenon we study is a product of "positive stereotypes" and can perhaps be more
accurately labeled as "reverse discrimination" since the group which is deemed to be superior faces
odds that are harder to overcome. In other words, the belief that black basketball players are better
creates a bias for betting on the more black team and it becomes more di¢ cult for the black team
to beat the spread.5 Still, one could think of this phenomenon in terms of the main theories of
discrimination in the microeconomics literature. In the rst of these theories, di¤erential behavior
towards a certain group of individuals is driven by the preference for not interacting with them
(Becker, 1957; Arrow, 1973). In other words, individuals have a "taste" for their own kind or a
distaste for the other kind. In the second theory, agents take race to be a signal for unobserved
or costly information about skill levels and mistaken beliefs can survive if they create self-fullling
outcomes (Phelps, 1972). In our context, information-based explanations would be more relevant
if bets reected the prior belief that blacks are better at basketball while the ndings would t the
taste-based explanations if white bettors bet against more black teams. Unfortunately, we do not
have information on the race of the individual bettors but we use the demographic characteristics
of the region which hosts the team to indirectly address this issue. The lack of a signicant
relationship between the racial composition of the host communities and that of the teams support
information-based, rather than taste-based, explanations.
Our paper relates to the literature documenting and explaining market anomalies in nance as
well. Closely related to our premise of studying the impact of a common perception in a nancial
market setting, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and Hong and Kostovetsky (2011) look at case of
the "sin stocks" and political values in investment decisions. Wolfers (2006a) examines the stock
market returns of companies with female CEOs. Sports betting markets, in particular, provide an
attractive ground for testing market e¢ ciency because, unlike most nancial markets, the sports
betting markets contain well-dened prices, well-dened outcomes and a nite time horizon. In
particular, sports betting markets have outcomes which are realized within a short time frame, are
5Cheryan and Bodenhausen (2000) provide evidence that stereotypes can lead to such a "choking e¤ect" by
looking at the performance of Asian-American women in math tests.
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observable by all market participants, and are unambiguous (no measurement error or uncertainty
about the horizon over which outcomes should be measured). Finally, these markets are unlikely
to have uninformed traders due to the widespread availability of information. Therefore, the
questions related to the e¢ ciency of the sports betting markets are of interest to economists in
order to test market e¢ ciency hypotheses in general. Echoing ndings in other nancial markets,
several studies have found ine¢ ciencies in the sports betting markets.6 For instance, studies
have found that bettors erroneously place bets for sentimental reasons (Avery and Chevalier, 1999;
Braun and Kvasnicka, 2008; Forrest and Simmons, 2008), on teams which are deemed hot (Brown
and Sauer, 1993; Camerer, 1989), and on teams which are favorites (Golec and Tamarkin, 1991;
Grey and Grey, 1997). Levitt (2004) nds, using data on the wagers placed by bettors as part
of a handicapping contest o¤ered at an online sports book during the 2001-02 NFL season, that
the amount of money placed on each side of the bet is not equal and this imbalance is related to
observable information. In particular, Levitt nds that the proportion of money bet is higher for
favorites and road teams. Interpreting this nding, he argues that the bookmakers set the spread in
order to exploit common biases: people like favorites and people do not su¢ ciently account for the
home eld advantage.7 Paul and Weinbach (2011) corroborate this nding using the percentage
of bets actually placed on NFL games. Our analysis shows that the bets on NBA games are also
distorted by racial stereotypes.
The particular bias we study, i.e., the common belief that black players are better than their
white counterparts, has been the subject of experimental investigation of the e¤ects of stereotypes
on judgments in sports.8 For instance, Stone, Perry and Darley (1997) directed subjects to listen to
an audio clip of a basketball game after viewing a picture of the player whom they were instructed
to judge. The subjects who were shown a picture of a black player rated the performance as better
than those subjects who were shown a picture of a white player. While existing experiments are
suggestive of biases in judgments involving race and athletic performance, since the accuracy of
these judgments are not related to the material incentives of the subjects, it can be di¢ cult to
interpret these results. However, our study is not vulnerable to this critique because obviously
betting on the outcome of a basketball game is indeed related to a persons material incentives.
Others have also looked at the e¤ect of race on outcomes in sports. Again, this literature is
signicant beyond the sports context because it involves decisions which exhibit large incentives for
success or accuracy and the outcomes can be objectively measured. Price and Wolfers (2010) nd
a negative relationship between the personal fouls assessed against NBA players and the number
6See Barberis and Thaler (2002) for a general overview and Sauer (1998) for applications in sports betting.
7Also see Kuypers (2000). Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) discuss the evidence that, in the odds betting of horse
racing, bettors have a bias towards betting on longshots rather than on favorites.
8For more on the stereotype of the athletic black man, see Biernat and Manis (1994), Sailes (1996), and Stone
et. al. (1999).
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of own-race referees who o¢ ciated the game. Relatedly, Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates and Hamer-
mesh (2011) nd that the likelihood of a called strike in baseball is related to the agreement of the
pitchers and umpires race. Although these judgments are made by well-trained and experienced
professionals, they are also made under great duress and must be made almost instantaneously.
Therefore, it is possible that these judgments, while obviously of great signicance, would be atten-
uated if they were made under di¤erent circumstances. By contrast, the judgments which comprise
the data we provide are made by individuals who have the opportunity to reect on the merits of
their decisions. Hence, our ndings imply that racial stereotypes may a¤ect decisions even when
they are made under an extended period of deliberation.
In a similar vein, Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008) nd that the relationship between race
and fouls documented in Price and Wolfers (2010) is signicant enough so that, given information
about the race of the referees and the relative racial composition of the teams, one could improve
their chances of placing a winning bet against the spread. By contrast, we focus primarily on the
racial composition of the teams. Hence, the bias we examine emerges from the simple observation
that many believe black players to be better, rather than the less visible notion that the referees
exhibit own-race bias. In addition, we analyze the opening and closing lines and we nd evidence
that the bookmakers are aware of the bias, thus suggesting that the phenomenon is more likely
to be driven by information-based motivations rather than by taste-based explanations. In other
words, we provide evidence consistent with the assertion that the bettors may be taking the racial
composition of the teams as a signal to guide their betting decisions (statistical discrimination à
la Phelps). The evidence also supports the claim that the bookmakers incorporate all relevant
information which may not be reected in the racial discrepancy between the teams and set the
spread so that they can exploit the information-based bias of the bettors. Finally, as does Larsen,
Price, and Wolfers (2008), we o¤er an analysis of a simple betting strategy. The simple betting
strategy proposed by Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008) involves the interaction of the di¤erences
in the race of the teams and the referees, and in our case it is exclusively a function of the racial
composition of the teams. Hence, arguably, our strategy requires less information and is less
computationally-intensive than theirs. Our betting strategies prove to be at least as protable,
and often more so, than the ones analyzed in Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008). Despite the
di¤erences between Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008) and the present paper, we view our work as
o¤ering a complementary investigation into the relationship between race and betting markets.
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3 Data
Our baseline dataset combines box score information on all regular season NBA games played
from the 1993-94 season to the 2007-08 season. We exclude the playo¤ games since the outcomes
for these games tend to be path-dependent not only across games in the same series but also
through rounds, thus accentuating the survivorship bias in the sense that the number of player or
team observations would closely depend on their past performance. The box score information
is obtained at the player-game level from www.basketball-reference.com, which also keeps track of
draft picks and other background information of the players, such as the height and weight. The
ultimate team-game level dataset is constructed from these player-by-player observations, obtained
from www.basketball-reference.com.
One crucial variable, however, for our analysis that is missing from the www.basketball-reference.com
website is the race of the players. In some cases (mostly for players who are still active), a picture of
the player accompanies the statistics but this happens only at a small fraction of the overall player
universe during our sample period. Hence, we conduct an extensive search to obtain information on
the race of the players, navigating www.nba.com, www.hoopedia.nba.com, www.draftreview.com,
and Google images search. This information enables us, by visual inspection, to characterize the
racial membership of the players. Admittedly, we use a rather coarse denition of race by as-
signing players (and coaches) into two broad categories of black and white, where white includes
Caucasians, Asians, and Latinos. Yet, we use several measures of the racial composition of the
team in order to ensure robustness of the results involving a variable as subjective as a players race.
Further, we also double-check our classication of the racial membership of the players against that
used in Price and Wolfers (2010). The discrepancy between the racial classication exists for a
mere 31 out of 1128 matched players. This di¤erence corresponds to only 2.5 percent of the more
than a quarter of a million player-game observations used in our dataset.
The data for the betting lines are obtained from www.goldsheet.com. We verify the accuracy of
the betting lines from this source against other sources commonly-used in the academic studies of
sports betting, such as www.covers.com, and nd no signicant discrepancies. In fact, information
on the ultimate outcomes of the games tends to be more accurate in www.goldsheet.com than it is
in www.covers.com: of the 41 cases when a discrepancy between the two sources exists, the cross-
check with www.espn.com conrms that the former has the correct information 80 percent of the
time. We complement this information on point spreads and closing lines with information on the
opening lines and the percent of bets placed on each side of the bet.9
A total of 18,450 regular-season games were played during the sample period. After excluding
9These data are available, at a fee, from www.sportsbetting.com.
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games for which there is a missing box score or racial composition data, we are left with 17,211
games. Further, after excluding games for which there was no betting information and where the
betting outcome was a push leading to cancellation of all bets (which happens around 1.3 percent
of the time), we are left with 16,402 games in the sample. Before we move to the formal analysis,
we present some descriptive statistics of this nal dataset.
Of the 1021 players who were active in the NBA during our sample period, 71.8 percent are
black. Black players are even more over-represented in the starting line-up of the teams: on average,
only one out of ve starters is white. In a typical game, each team employs 9 to 11 players, 8
of which are, on average, black players. As a result, at the player-game level, 76.7 percent of the
observations are identied as being associated with a black player. These statistics conrm the
casual observations on the dominance of black players in the NBA, not only by sheer number but
also by the visibility they obtain by playing more minutes in more games.
Tables 1a and 1b provide a summary of the data used in our analysis at the player-game level,
and Table 2 summarizes the data at the team-game level. At the player-game level, there are some
statistically signicant di¤erences between black and white players. However, it is not always the
case that black players have "more desirable qualities" and the magnitudes of these di¤erences are
not very meaningful. For instance, while on average black players score roughly two points more
than their white counterparts, they are not as e¢ cient as demonstrated by their slightly lower eld
goal percentages. These statistics are not altered drastically when the raw statistics are adjusted
for playing time (Table 1b). According to these metrics, black players overall do not appear to
be much better than their white peers. If one assumes that the team is a sum or reection of the
skill levels of individual players, there seems to be no obvious statistical reason to deem more black
teams to be of better quality.
At the team-game level, on which we conduct the empirical analysis, we summarize the informa-
tion on betting spreads and the racial composition of the teams. Racial composition is measured
by three alternative metrics: the number of black starters, the number of black players on the team
roster regardless of whether they actually play in a game, and the minutes played by black players.
This nal metric is calculated as the average of the past ve games the team has played and is
expressed as a percentage of the total minutes in the game. To avoid duplication, all variables are
expressed from the home teams perspective. Simple statistics point to a slight advantage for the
home team as they win the game 60 percent of the time by an average margin of around 4 points
and beat the spread 55 percent of the time by an average of 2 points. However, note that the home
team is the favorite 70 percent of the time. A home favorite wins the game 72 percent of the time
while a home underdog wins only 34 percent of the time. Point spreads seem to take this into
account at least partially: a home favorite beats the spread 59 percent of the time and a home
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underdog covers 48 percent of the time. Note that the partial o¤set of the home court advantage
is in line with earlier studies showing a similar bias in NFL betting markets (Levitt, 2004).
4 Analysis
4.1 Accuracy of point spreads and the link between race and winning
probability
In order to demonstrate the relationship between performance against the spread and the racial
makeup of the teams, we estimate the following regression:
P (home team beats the spread)it = + blackit + Xh + 'Ys + (Xh  Ys) + "it
where the the dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the home team
beats the spread on game i played at date t and 0 otherwise, blackit is the di¤erence between
the "blackness" of the home team and the visiting team, Xh and Ys are (home) team and season
(during which date t is included) xed e¤ects, respectively. As noted in the previous section, the
blackness of a team is measured by the various metrics (number of black starters, number of black
players in the team roster, and the portion of minutes played by black players in the previous ve
games).
Thus, our empirical approach rests on a baseline specication where the probability that the
home team beats the spread is a function of the racial composition of the team relative to its
opponent. This relies on two assumptions and, before moving on to the analysis, we conrm that
these assumptions hold.
The rst assumption is that basketball betting markets are, in general, e¢ cient, in that any
observable information should be reected in the spread. So, we start our analysis by looking at
the accuracy of point spreads in forecasting the game outcome. Figure 1 shows the distribution
of "forecast errors," dened as the actual margin (or realized spread) minus the point spread on
a game. Indeed, the errors closely resemble a normal distribution with zero mean.10 Figure 2
formally veries this statement by plotting the quintiles of the forecast error against the quintiles
from a normal distribution.11 We nd that the NBA betting markets are, in general, e¢ cient in
the sense that the distribution of the di¤erence between the winning margin and the point spread
is not distinguishable from a normal distribution. In line with this, when plotted against the
10See Wolfers (2006b) who examines the distribution of errors in college basketball games and nds evidence of
point shaving in games with a large point spread.
11Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test as well as skewness and kurtosis test for normality further
verify that forecast errors are normally distributed. Results of these tests are available from the authors upon
request.
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realized winning margins, one can see that the point spread is an accurate forecast of the actual
game outcomes (Figure 3).
The second assumption is that the probability of winning a game does not increase in the
relative blackness of the teams. Table 3 presents the results of a regression analysis where the more
black team in a match-up is shown not to have a systematically higher probability of winning a
game. The sign on the variables of interest, i.e., blackness of the home team relative to the visiting
team, varies from one specication to the next and is not always signicant when the dependent
variable is the realized margin on the game (upper panel in Table 3). Therefore, there is little
evidence of a positive association between the blackness of the teams and the decisiveness of the
nal scores. A quick glance at the table would suggest a somewhat robust negative relationship
between the blackness of the teams and the probability of winning (lower panel in Table 3).12 It
should be noted that this is not necessarily a sign of lower quality or generally worse performance
of teams composed of more black players against teams with more white players. Rather, in these
specications, the relative blackness of a team may be capturing the e¤ect of other factors which
determine the performance of one team against another. Indeed, once factors such as the record
of the team up to a specic game in a season is controlled for, the magnitude and signicance of
this coe¢ cient is weakened.13 In summary, our assumption that the probability of winning a game
does not increase with the di¤erences in racial composition towards blackness has support in the
data.
With the two assumptions veried, we now proceed to the regression analysis of the point spread
and actual game outcomes.
4.2 Race and point spreads
Table 4 presents our main ndings. In a nutshell, our analysis shows that a more black team tends
to face a higher spread and that the team exhibits worse performance against the spread. Note that
in each regression, team xed e¤ects and season xed e¤ects are employed. In addition, we also
control for the team-season interactions. Hence, neither the time-invarying team characteristics
nor the team-invarying time e¤ects are driving the results.14
In the upper panel, the dependent variable is the spread faced by the home team. According
12Notice that the team with more black starters is likely to have a larger realized margin but a lower probability of
winning. While this seems a bit curious, it is consistent with a few outliers where the team with more black starters
had a blowout when they won. Also note that the association between the di¤erences in the blackness of the teams
and the realized margin of the game is not robust as the positive signicant coe¢ cient disappears when alternative
measures of blackness are used.
13These results are not presented here for sake of brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
14The results presented in the tables are estimated using probit when the dependent variable is a binary variable,
e.g., the probability of beating the spread. To ensure that the results do not su¤er from the incidental parameters
problem, we also estimate these specication using ordinary least squares. The sign and signicance of the coe¢ cients
of interest are indeed robust to the choice of estimation method.
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to our three measures of the racial di¤erences between the teams, we see that there is a positive
relationship between the spread and these measures. In the middle panel, the dependent variable is
the realized margin of the home team minus the spread. Based on the three measures of the racial
di¤erences between the teams, we see that there is a negative relationship between the blackness
of the team and the realized margin minus spread. In the lower panel, the dependent variable is
a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the home team beats the spread and zero otherwise. Again,
according to our three measures of the racial di¤erences between the teams, we nd a negative
relationship between the blackness of the team and the probability that they cover the spread. To
summarize, we nd evidence that a more black team tends to face a larger point spread and that
these teams perform worse against the spread. The evidence so far supports part of the conjecture
we introduced at the beginning: point spreads, even as they control for all relevant and available
information on the two teams facing each other, are disproportionately higher for more black teams,
consistent with the belief that they are better than those with more white players.
4.3 Biased bettors or biased bookmakers?
A natural question then is, what is driving the relationship between the racial composition of the
teams and the performance against the spread? There are two main competing hypotheses. The
rst hypothesis is that the bookmakers are aware of the racial bias of bettors and they set the spread
in such a way to exploit the bias à la Levitt (2004). The second hypothesis is that the bookmakers
are unaware of the bias of the bettors and set the spread to be the expected nal score of the game
and the relationship found above is caused by bettors who systematically bet on the more black
team, thus moving the spread. In order to distinguish between these hypotheses, we investigate
whether there is a relationship between the movement of the spread and the racial composition of
the teams. Figure 4 demonstrates that the movement of the spread is normally distributed with a
mean of zero.
Table 5a presents the results of our regressions involving the movement of the spread.15 In our
rst specication, in which we do not account for team- and season-specic factors, or team-season
interaction terms, we nd a signicant relationship between race and the movement of the spread.
However, for the three specications in which we do account for these xed e¤ects, we do not nd
a signicant relationship between the race of the teams and movement of the spread. Moreover,
from Table 4, we know that there is a systemic relationship between the relative racial composition
of the teams and the spread itself. Hence, the spread reects the belief that teams with more black
15 In the remainder of the tables, for the sake of brevity, we only show the results involving the di¤erence in black
starters. The results are virtually identical when the other two metrics are used and are available from the authors
upon request.
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players should be placed as favorites. Indeed, more (less) money appears to be bet on the home
team if it has more (less) black players than the visiting team, as shown in Figure 5. To further
this argument, we investigate whether the money bet on the home team is related to the relative
racial composition of the teams in a statistically signicant way. Table 5b shows the results of this
exercise. There appears to be a positive, albeit statistically weak, relationship between the racial
composition of the team and the percent of money bet in favor of the home team. Put di¤erently,
the spread is set in a way that the resulting bets are skewed in favor of the more black team. Based
on the regressions in Tables 5a and 5b, we favor the explanation that bookmakers are aware of the
bias of bettors and set the spread to exploit this bias.
4.4 Robustness checks
How robust are our results? We perform several robustness checks controlling for the race of the
referees, the race of the coaches, and the racial composition of the location of the home team.
First, one concern is that our results no longer hold when one accounts for the racial composition
of the referee crew. For instance, Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008) nd that the racial composition
of the referee crew, together with the racial composition of the teams, is relevant and can make an
impact on the probability of a team winning the game and, hence, beating the spread. Specically,
the authors nd that teams can become disadvantaged when the racial composition of the referee
crew di¤ers from the racial composition of the team. We perform a series of regressions with the
dependent variable as the probability of beating the spread, however, we restrict attention to the
following categories: an all-white crew, a crew with at least one black referee, a crew with at least
one white referee, and an all-black crew. We also consider the case where the crew is neither
all black nor all white. Finally, we add the proportion of white referees as an additional control
variable in our baseline specication. Table 6a presents the results of these regressions. Even when
accounting for the racial composition of the referee crew, our results remain signicant in each case
with the exception of an all-black crew. However, note that an all-black crew is an extremely rare
occurrence as it accounts for only 152 games out of 16,186 in our sample. Hence, in the majority
of the games in our sample, it remains true that it is harder for the more black team to beat the
spread.
Second, another important factor could be the race of the coaches. One could imagine that
when the home team has more black players and, according to the beliefs of some, is more talented,
there can be an additional bias if bettors also think that a more black team led by a black head
coach should do even better than they would when led by a white head coach. We follow a similar
approach as when controlling for the racial composition of referees and split our sample by the
15
di¤erence in the race of the head coaches of the two teams. Again, we also run a regression where
the di¤erence between race of the home teams head coach and that of the visiting teams head
coach is introduced as an additional control variable. Results of these regressions are presented in
Table 6b. Interestingly, more black home teams actually have a better chance of beating the spread
when their head coach is white but the visiting team is led by a black head coach. Regardless,
note that when the coaches are of the same race (a majority of the cases), the negative relationship
between the blackness of the team and the probability of beating the spread prevails. Finally,
our nding from the baseline regression also holds when the di¤erence between the head coaches is
controlled for as an additional regressor in the specication.
It is also possible that the biases found above are related to the racial composition of the bettor
or the racial composition of the location of the basketball team. While we cannot account for
the race of the bettors, we can control for the racial composition of the location of the teams.
Therefore, to the extent that a person living in the location of the team is more likely to bet on
the team, we can test whether our results are driven by the characteristics of the populations at
the locations of the teams. We run a series of probits with probability of beating the spread as the
dependent variable. We include the di¤erence in black starters as an independent variable, while
accounting for the racial composition of the location of the teams. In particular we account for the
di¤erence in the proportion of blacks in the city and di¤erence in the proportion of blacks in the
state. In Table 6c, we present the results of these regressions. In all specications, the di¤erence
in black starters remains signicant, and neither of the terms accounting for the racial composition
of the location are signicant. As a result, we do not nd evidence that the racial composition of
the locations are related to the bias found above.
On a related question about the race of the audience and the team, Kanazawa and Funk (2001)
nd that the television ratings of games are positively related to the fraction of white players on the
teams. This is seemingly at odds with the evidence that white teams are perceived to be worse at
basketball. Presumably spectators attend basketball games or watch on television in order to see
"good basketball." If this was the case, there would be a negative relationship between the white
composition of the teams and television ratings for that game. Yet, this nding could be explained
if the majority of NBA fans were white and, while white fans think that black players are better,
they still prefer to watch the white players, leading to a "premium" for white players. This is in
line with the own-race preference, which would predict that white audiences choose to watch white
players as they derive utility from associating with them even if they perceive the overall quality
of the basketball played by these players to be inferior. We do not, however, nd an analogous
relationship between betting on the more black home teams in locations with a higher proportion
of black population. This may imply that, when taking nancial decisions directly associated with
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basketball, audiences stick to the stereotypes, perhaps relying on them as informative signals.
Finally, our nding may not survive if performance criteria of the teams or the factors that
may be a¤ecting each teams performance against specic opponents are explicitly included in the
specication. As noted earlier, in our baseline, we control for time-invarying team characteristics
and team-invarying time e¤ects. But the performance and, relatedly, the morale of a team may
vary through a given season or when faced with a particular opponent, e.g., because their game
strategies are similar or because the bettors perceive a match between two specic teams di¤erently
from others. Another issue could be that bookmakers correct any systemic mistakes which may
occur in setting the spread as the same two teams face each other again and again. Table 6d
presents the results obtained when the di¤erence in the records and winning streaks (i.e., the
number of games the team won out of the last ve games played) of the teams are added to the
specication and xed e¤ects for specic team pairings are included. Our nding that the more
black team has a lower probability of beating the spread is robust to these checks.
4.5 Prot opportunities
So far, we have presented evidence that there is a negative relationship between the relative blackness
of a team and its probability of beating the spread. The question then is whether there are protable
strategies which consistently yield returns over the break-even hurdle. Accounting for the cost of
betting, the break-even hurdle requires a winning percentage higher than 52.4%. We consider three
simple strategies in Table 7: betting on the team with more black players, betting on the team with
more white players, and betting on the home team only when it has more white players than the
visiting team.16 The reason for distinguishing between the home and visiting team in the last
strategy is the fact that the home court advantage is not fully accounted for by the bettors: if one
always bets on the home team, they win 56% of the time and get a 6% return (similar to the nding
reported on NFL games in Levitt, 2004). Yet, betting on the whiter team regardless of where the
game is also delivers with a winning percentage of 57% and a return of 7%. Applying the "bet
on the white" strategy while also reecting on the home court advantage, improves the returns on
simply betting on the home team by 13 percentage points by using the information on the racial
composition of the teams. The bets placed this way, on average, win 63 percent of the time for an
overall average return of 19 percent.
Across seasons the prots obtained by following the "bet on the white home team" strategy are
persistent over time. In the 2007-08 season, as a result of the strategy of only betting on the home
16One could, of course, design betting strategies based on the full roster of the rival teams or the minutes played
by black players in the last few games. We obtain similar results using such strategies but prefer to present the
results with the black starters in each team because this is the statistic that is the most easily-accessible and the
least computation-intensive.
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team when it has 1, 2, 3, or 4 more white players in the starting line-up than the visiting team, we
observe the probability of a winning bet to be as high as 75 percent and net returns (accounting
for the cost of betting) ranging from 10 percent to 43 percent. Table 8 presents the results of
adopting this strategy over our whole sample period. Indeed, this strategy of betting on the home
team when it has more white players delivers positive net returns that not only increase with the
starkness of the racial di¤erence between the two teams but also persist from one season to the
next. This may suggest that, although learning opportunities abound, the bettorsbehavior still
reects the mistaken belief that teams with more black players are better, akin to the nding in
Pope and Schweitzer (2011).
5 Conclusion
This paper looks at the impact of the positive stereotype of the black basketball star on nancial
decisions, as revealed in the market outcomes, using evidence from sports betting markets. We
nd evidence of a bias in NBA betting markets based on race. We also nd evidence that this bias
is exploited by the bookmakers. This nding can be explained by bettors taking race as a signal
of skill level in deciding on which team to bet and bookmakers setting the point spreads higher for
more black teams. An implication of our ndings is that stereotypes, and biases in general, may
a¤ect nancial decisions and, hence, market outcomes.
These ndings add to the literature showing the importance of biases in economic decision
making. In particular, we demonstrate that market makers process the available information
e¢ ciently but at the same time, when setting the prices, allow for the fact that the participants
have a bias, which they do not correct, even though not doing so has directly recognized costs.
Information-based discrimination is more likely to explain the phenomenon in the case we study
since the prices do not adjust much after being initially set. We also provide evidence that biases
do indeed carry over from laboratory experiments to real markets even when stakes are high and
the agents have time and opportunity to learn.
What do these ndings mean for other economic markets? If we nd persistently-mistaken,
nancially-disadvantageous beliefs in a market with obviously- and immediately-realized nancial
costs and many opportunities to learn, then we would expect there to be such in other markets.
Most straightforwardly, do presumptions about intellectual or athletic ability based on stereotypes
increase or decrease the odds of success for certain groups in certain elds? Another, perhaps
a socially and politically uncomfortable question which may arise from this analysis is, if people
are prone to making suboptimal sports betting decisions due to racial stereotypes, do people make
similar costly judgment errors in other economic decisions? For instance, do employers hire engi-
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neers with a background from a particular region presuming that they have an innate ability for
quantitative tasks? Or, is provision of health, education, and other social services a¤ected by
subconscious attitudes towards some groups? These and other interesting questions are left for
further research.
19
References
[1] Akerlof, George A, 1980, "A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One
Consequence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 749-775.
[2] Altonji, Joseph and Rebecca Blank, 1999, "Race and Gender in the Labor Market," Handbook
of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 3143-3259.
[3] Antonovics, Kate and Brian G. Knight, 2009, "A New Look at Racial Proling: Evidence
from the Boston Police Department," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 91, No. 1, pp.
163-177.
[4] Arrow, Kenneth J., 1973, "The Theory of Discrimination," in Orley Ashenfelter and Albert
Rees, eds. Discrimination in Labor Markets, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp.
3-33.
[5] Avery, Christopher and Judith Chevalier, 1999, "Identifying Investor Sentiment from Price
Paths: The Case of Football Betting," Journal of Business, Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 493-521.
[6] Ayres, Ian and Peter Siegelman, 1995, "Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a
New Car," American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 304-321.
[7] Becker, Gary, 1957, The Economics of Discrimination, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
[8] Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004, "Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination," American
Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 991-1013.
[9] Biernat, Monica and Melvin Manis, 1994, "Shifting Standards and Stereotype-Based Judg-
ments," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 66, No. 1, pp. 5-20.
[10] Braun, Sebastian and Michael Kvasnicka, 2008, "Against All Odds? National Sentiment and
Wagering on European Football," working paper, Ruhr-Universitat Bochum # 42.
[11] Brown, William O. and Raymond D. Sauer, 1993, "Fundamentals or Noise? Evidence from the
Professional Basketball Betting Market," Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 1193-1209.
[12] Camerer, Colin F., 1989, "Does the Basketball Market Believe in the Hot Hand?," American
Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 5 (Dec., 1989), pp. 1257-1261.
[13] Camerer, Colin F., George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, eds. 2004, Advances in Behavioral
Economics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
20
[14] Charles, Kerwin K. and Jonathan Guryan, 2008, "Prejudice and Wages: An Empirical Assess-
ment of Beckers The Economics of Discrimination," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 116,
No. 5, pp. 773-809.
[15] Cheryan, Sapna and Galen V. Bodenhausen, 2000, "When Positive Stereotypes Threaten In-
tellectual Performance: The Psychological Hazards of Model Minority Status," Psychological
Science, Vol. 11, No. 5, pp. 399-402.
[16] Darity Jr., William A. and Patrick L. Mason, 1998, "Evidence on Discrimination in Employ-
ment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 2,
pp. 63-90.
[17] DellaVigna, Stefano, 2009, "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," Journal of
Economic Literature, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 31572.
[18] Entine, Jon, 2000, Taboo: Why Black Athletes Dominate Sports And Why We Are Afraid To
Talk About It. New York, NY: Public A¤airs.
[19] Forrest, David and Robert Simmons, 2008, "Sentiment in the Betting Market on Spanish
Football," Applied Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 119-126.
[20] George, Nelson, 1999, Elevating the Game: Black Men and Basketball, Lincoln, NE: University
of Nebraska Press.
[21] Golec, Joseph and Maurry Tamarkin, 1991, "The Degree of Ine¢ ciency in the Football Betting
Market," Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 30, pp. 311-323.
[22] Grey, Philip K. and Stephen F. Grey, 1997, "Testing Market E¢ ciency: Evidence From The
NFL Sports Betting Market," Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 1725-1737.
[23] Heckman, James J., 1998, "Detecting Discrimination," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.
12, No. 2, pp. 101-116.
[24] Hong, Harrison and Marcin Kacperczyk, 2009, "The Price of Sin: The E¤ects of Social Norms
on Markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 93, pp. 1536.
[25] Hong, Harrison and Leonard Kostovetsky, 2011, "Red and Blue Investing: Values and Finance,"
forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics.
[26] Kanazawa, Mark T. and Jonas P. Funk, 2001, "Racial Discrimination in Professional Basket-
ball: Evidence from Nielsen Ratings," Economic Inquiry, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 599-608.
21
[27] Kuypers, T., 2000, "Information E¢ ciency: An Empirical Study of a Fixed Odds Betting
Market," Applied Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 1353-1363.
[28] Larsen, Tim, Joseph Price and Justin Wolfers, 2008, "Racial Bias in the NBA: Implications in
Betting Markets," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 1-19.
[29] Levitt, Steven D., 2004, "Why are Gambling Markets Organised so Di¤erently from Financial
Markets?," Economic Journal, Vol. 114, No. 495, pp. 223-246.
[30] Levitt, Steven D., 2004, "Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence from Weakest Link,"
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 431-453.
[31] Munnell, Alicia H., Geo¤rey M. B. Tootell, Lynn E. Browne and James McEneaney, 1996,
"Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data," American Economic Review, Vol.
86, No. 1, pp. 25-53.
[32] Page, Marianne, 1995, "Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets: Evidence
from a Recent Audit Study," Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 183-206.
[33] Parsons, Christopher A., Johan Sulaeman, Michael C. Yates and Daniel S. Hamermesh, 2011,
"Strike Three: Discrimination, Incentives and Evaluation," American Economic Review, Vol.
101, No. 4, pp. 1410-1435.
[34] Paul, Rodney J. and Andrew P. Weinbach, 2011, "NFL Bettor Biases and Price Setting:
Further Tests of the Levitt Hypothesis of Sportsbook Behavior," Applied Economics Letters,
Vol. 18, No. 2, 193-197.
[35] Phelps, Edmund S., 1972, "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism," American Economic
Review, Vol. 62, pp. 659-61.
[36] Pope, Devin G. and Maurice E. Schweitzer, 2011, "Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent
Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes," American Economic Review,
Vol. 101, pp. 129157.
[37] Pope, Devin G. and Justin R. Sydnor, 2011, "Whats in a Picture? Evidence of Discrimination
from Prosper.com," Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 53-92.
[38] Price, Joseph and Justin Wolfers, 2010, "Racial Discrimination among NBA Referees," Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, Vol. 125, No. 4, pp. 1859-1887.
[39] Romer, David, 1984, "The Theory of Social Custom: A Modication and Some Extensions,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 717-727.
22
[40] Ross, Stephen L. and John Yinger, 2002, The Color of Credit: Mortgage Discrimination,
Research Methodology, and Fair-Lending Enforcement, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[41] Sailes, G., 1996, "An Investigation of Campus Stereotypes: The Myth of the Black Athletic
Superiority and the Dumb Jock Stereotype," in R. E. Lapchick, ed. Sport in Society: Equal
Opportunity or Business as Usual? Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishers, pp. 193-202.
[42] Sauer, Raymond D., 1998, "The Economics of Wagering Markets," Journal of Economic Lit-
erature, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 2021-2064.
[43] Snowberg, Erik and Justin Wolfers, 2010, "Explaining the Favorite-Longshot Bias: Is it Risk-
Love or Misperceptions?," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 118, No. 4, pp. 723-746.
[44] Stone, Je¤, Zachary W. Perry and John M. Darley, 1997, "White Men Cant Jump: Evidence
for the Perceptual Conrmation of Racial Stereotypes Following a Basketball Game," Basic
and Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 291-306.
[45] Stone, Je¤, Christian I. Lynch, Mike Sjomeling and John M. Darley, 1999, "Stereotype Threat
E¤ects on Black and White Athletic Performance," Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, Vol. 77, No. 6, pp. 1213-1227.
[46] Wolfers, Justin, 2006a, "Diagnosing Discrimination: Stock Returns and CEO Gender," Journal
of the European Economic Association, Vol. 4, No. 2-3, pp. 531-541.
[47] Wolfers, Justin, 2006b, "Point Shaving: Corruption in NCAA Basketball," American Economic
Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 279-283.
[48] Yinger, John, 1998, "Evidence on Discrimination in Consumer Markets," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 23-40.
23
Figure 1: Distribution of Forecast Errors
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Figure 2: Di¤erence between the Winning Margin and the Point Spread against Normal Distribution
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Figure 3: Accuracy of Point Spreads
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Figure 4: Distribution of Moves in the Betting Line
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Figure 5: Distribution of Money Bet
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Table 1a. Summary Statistics at Player-Game Level: Raw
Black players White players Signicance
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. of di¤erence
Age 323705 27.80 4.21 98200 27.56 3.85 <0.01
Height (inches) 323705 78.47 3.60 98202 80.37 3.85 >0.99
Weight (pounds) 323705 213.42 27.07 98202 224.40 27.91 >0.99
Games started 323705 0.52 0.50 98200 0.45 0.50 <0.01
Minutes played 323705 24.77 11.99 98200 22.09 11.85 <0.01
Personal fouls 323704 2.23 1.55 98200 2.16 1.57 <0.01
Points 323702 10.18 8.29 98200 8.65 7.45 <0.01
Free throws attempted 323705 2.69 3.14 98200 2.15 2.73 <0.01
Free throws made 323705 2.00 2.52 98200 1.64 2.24 <0.01
Free throw percentage 206297 0.73 0.28 55808 0.75 0.29 >0.99
Field goals attempted 323705 8.45 5.98 98200 7.04 5.22 <0.01
Field goals made 323705 3.83 3.18 98200 3.24 2.85 <0.01
Field goal percentage 308737 0.44 0.23 91852 0.44 0.25 >0.99
Two point shots attempted 323705 6.98 5.27 98200 5.61 4.59 <0.01
Two point shots made 323705 3.32 2.93 98200 2.72 2.61 <0.01
Two point shot percentage 303843 0.46 0.25 89369 0.47 0.28 >0.99
Three point shots attempted 323705 1.46 2.15 98200 1.43 2.07 <0.01
Three point shots made 323705 0.51 1.01 98200 0.53 1.01 >0.99
Three point shot percentage 155425 0.31 0.32 46555 0.34 0.33 >0.99
O¤ensive rebounds 323705 1.25 1.55 98200 1.16 1.48 <0.01
Defensive rebounds 323705 2.99 2.71 98200 2.92 2.70 <0.01
Total rebounds 323705 4.23 3.66 98200 4.09 3.58 <0.01
Assists 323705 2.27 2.58 98200 2.04 2.65 <0.01
Steals 323705 0.83 1.06 98200 0.66 0.96 <0.01
Blocks 323705 0.50 0.95 98200 0.50 0.96 0.38
Turnovers 323705 1.49 1.47 98200 1.30 1.40 <0.01
Win score 323702 4.23 5.51 98200 4.18 5.33 >0.99
Notes: The last column shows the p-values from t-tests with the null hypothesis that the statistic for
black players is greater than the statistic for white players.
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Table 1b. Summary Statistics at Player-Game Level: Adjusted
Black players White players Signicance
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. of di¤erence
Personal fouls 323178 4.99 5.07 98028 5.61 6.14 >0.99
Points 323176 18.04 12.07 98028 17.13 12.79 <0.01
Free throws attempted 323179 4.89 6.32 98028 4.38 6.69 <0.01
Free throws made 323179 3.55 4.85 98028 3.24 5.14 <0.01
Free throw percentage 206288 1.53 1.86 55807 1.76 2.33 >0.99
Field goals attempted 323179 15.61 8.07 98028 14.71 8.39 <0.01
Field goals made 323179 6.80 4.90 98028 6.44 5.16 <0.01
Field goal percentage 308710 1.15 2.27 91836 1.35 2.73 >0.99
Two point shots attempted 323179 12.94 7.62 98028 11.78 7.99 <0.01
Two point shots made 323179 5.92 4.70 98028 5.43 4.92 <0.01
Two point shot percentage 303829 1.18 2.25 89363 1.37 2.67 >0.99
Three point shots attempted 323179 2.67 4.04 98028 2.92 4.52 >0.99
Three point shots made 323179 0.88 1.89 98028 1.01 2.22 >0.99
Three point shot percentage 155412 0.64 1.39 46544 0.80 1.83 >0.99
O¤ensive rebounds 323179 2.48 3.55 98028 2.66 3.95 >0.99
Defensive rebounds 323179 5.66 4.93 98028 6.20 5.52 >0.99
Total rebounds 323179 8.15 6.52 98028 8.85 7.17 >0.99
Assists 323179 4.09 4.46 98028 3.92 4.77 <0.01
Steals 323179 1.57 2.38 98028 1.39 2.44 <0.01
Blocks 323179 0.98 2.14 98028 1.09 2.40 >0.99
Turnovers 323179 2.99 3.56 98028 2.90 3.87 <0.01
Win score 323176 6.74 11.70 98028 7.28 12.88 >0.99
Notes: The last column shows the p-values from t-tests with the null hypothesis that the statistic for
black players is greater than the statistic for white players. Adjusted statistics are calculated by multiplying
the raw statistics in Table 1a with 48 (the total number of minutes in a regular game, i.e., no overtime)
and then dividing by the actual number of minutes played by that player in that game.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics at Team-Game Level
Obs Mean St. Dev.
All
Point spread 16375 -1.79 4.90
Realized margin 17183 3.35 14.15
Realized margin - spread 16375 1.59 12.25
Probability of beating the spread 16375 0.55 0.50
Black starters 17184 3.90 1.05
Di¤erence in black starters 17183 0.01 1.41
Black players in the roster 17184 7.60 1.63
Di¤erence in black players in the roster 17183 -0.01 2.12
Black minutes 17027 0.78 0.16
Di¤erence in black minutes 16987 0.001 0.21
Home underdog
Point spread 4866 4.52 2.56
Realized margin 5675 -3.17 13.19
Realized margin - spread 4866 0.39 11.63
Probability of beating the spread 4866 0.48 0.50
Black starters 5675 3.99 0.97
Di¤erence in black starters 5675 0.20 1.41
Black players in the roster 5675 7.66 1.57
Di¤erence in black players in the roster 5675 0.16 2.11
Black minutes 5612 0.80 0.14
Di¤erence in black minutes 5608 0.03 0.21
Home favorite
Point spread 11509 -4.46 2.74
Realized margin 11508 6.57 13.49
Realized margin - spread 11509 2.10 12.47
Probability of beating the spread 11509 0.59 0.49
Black starters 11509 3.85 1.08
Di¤erence in black starters 11508 -0.08 1.41
Black players in the roster 11509 7.58 1.66
Di¤erence in black players in the roster 11508 -0.10 2.12
Black minutes 11415 0.77 0.17
Di¤erence in black minutes 11379 -0.02 0.21
Notes: Point spread is the quoted spread on a game as of closing time for bets, expressed from the
home teams perspective. Realized margin is the actual di¤erence between the home team score and the
visiting team score at the end of the game. Probability of beating the spread is a dummy that is 1 if a
bet on the home team wins. Black starters is the number of black players in the starting line-up. Black
players in the roster is the number of black players in the full team roster. Black minutes is the proportion
of minutes played by black players to the total minutes in the game, calculated over the past ve games
the team has played. These measures of blackness of a team refer to the home team. Di¤erence in black
starters is calculated as the number of black players in the starting line-up (number of black players in the
roster, proportion of black minutes) in the home team minus the number of black players in the starting
line-up (number of black players in the roster, proportion of black minutes) in the visiting team.
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Table 3. Winning the Game
Realized margin
Di¤erence in black starters 0.098 0.286***
[0.080] [0.105]
Di¤. in black players in the roster 0.048 0.091
[0.059] [0.066]
Di¤erence in black minutes -4.152*** -4.347***
[0.579] [0.675]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions no yes no yes no yes
Observations 17183 17183 17183 17183 16987 16987
R-squared 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.14
Probability of winning
Di¤erence in black starters -0.024*** -0.023***
[0.008] [0.009]
Di¤. in black players in the roster -0.021*** -0.029***
[0.005] [0.006]
Di¤erence in black minutes -0.331*** -0.399***
[0.053] [0.065]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions no yes no yes no yes
Observations 17183 17183 17183 17183 16987 16987
Notes: The dependent variable in the upper panel is the realized margin in the game, computed as the
home team score minus the visiting team score. The dependent variable in the lower panel is the probability
of winning, which is a dummy that is 1 if the home team won the game. The regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares for the winning margin, and using probit for the probability of winning. Di¤erence in
black starters is calculated as the number of black players in the starting line-up (number of black players
in the roster, proportion of black minutes over the past ve games) in the home team minus the number
of black players in teh starting line-up (number of black players in the roster, proportion of black minutes
over the past ve games) in the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and
* denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Beating the Spread
Point spread
Di¤erence in black starters 0.269*** 0.341***
[0.029] [0.029]
Di¤. in black players in the roster 0.092*** 0.132***
[0.019] [0.019]
Di¤erence in black minutes 2.264*** 2.940***
[0.204] [0.211]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions no yes no yes no yes
Observations 16374 16374 16374 16374 16192 16192
R-squared 0.09 0.31 0.08 0.30 0.09 0.31
Realized margin - spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.291*** -0.227***
[0.073] [0.084]
Di¤. in black players in the roster -0.211*** -0.240***
[0.048] [0.054]
Di¤erence in black minutes -1.878*** -1.441***
[0.512] [0.602]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions no yes no yes no yes
Observations 16374 16374 16374 16374 16192 16192
R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07
Probability of beating the spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.023*** -0.023***
[0.008] [0.008]
Di¤. in black players in the roster -0.022*** -0.030***
[0.005] [0.006]
Di¤erence in black minutes -0.129** -0.135**
[0.053] [0.064]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions no yes no yes no yes
Observations 16374 16374 16374 16374 16192 16192
Notes: The dependent variable in the upper panel is the point spread quoted on the game, expressed
from the home teams perspective. The dependent variable in the middle panel is the di¤erence between
the realized margin (the actual outcome of the game) and the point spread. The dependent variable in the
lower panel is the probability of beating the spread, which is a dummy that is 1 if a bet on the home team
wins. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares for the point spread and the di¤erence
between the realized margin and the spread, and using probit for the probability of beating the spread.
Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the number of black players in the starting line-up (number of
black players in the roster, proportion of black minutes over the past ve games) in the home team minus
the number of black players in teh starting line-up (number of black players in the roster, proportion of
black minutes over the past ve games) in the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets.
***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5a. Moving the Line
Closing line - Opening line
Di¤erence in black starters 0.014** 0.008 0.008 0.006
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]
Team xed e¤ects no yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects no no yes yes
Team-season interactions no no no yes
Observations 7977 7977 7977 7977
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Notes: The dependent variable is the di¤erence between the closing and opening values of the line on
the game, showing how much the point spread moves from the start of betting until all bets close. The
regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the
number of black starters in the home team minus the number of black starters in the visiting team. Robust
standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5b. Bias in Bets
Money bet on home team
Di¤erence in black starters 0.185 0.243* 0.243* 0.285*
[0.118] [0.140] [0.140] [0.158]
Team xed e¤ects no yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects no no yes yes
Team-season interactions no no no yes
Observations 8011 8011 8011 8011
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is the money placed as bets on the home team, expressed as a percentage
of the total bets placed on the game. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Di¤erence
in black starters is calculated as the number of black starters in the home team minus the number of black
starters in the visiting team. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6a. Robustness: Referees
Probability of beating the spread
At least one black referee At least one white referee
Di¤erence in black starters -0.018* -0.023***
[0.010] [0.009]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 12414 16007
All-black crew All-white crew
Di¤erence in black starters -0.092 -0.046**
[0.122] [0.020]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 152 3876
Neither all-black nor all-white crew Referee race as additional control
Di¤erence in black starters -0.019* -0.021**
[0.010] [0.009]
Proportion of white referees -0.141***
[0.043]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 12027 16281
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the
number of black starters in the home team minus the number of black starters in the visiting team. The
race composition of referees are taken into account by splitting the sample by the proportion of black referees
in the 3-person crew. Alternatively, the proportion of white referees is included as a control variable. Robust
standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6b. Robustness: Coaches
Probability of beating the spread
Black (H), white (V) White (H), black (V)
Di¤erence in black starters -0.018 0.051**
[0.019] [0.024]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 3201 3142
Both black or both white Coach race as additional control
Di¤erence in black starters -0.037*** -0.017*
[0.012] [0.009]
Di¤erence in coachesrace -0.092***
[0.022]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 9864 16374
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the
number of black starters in the home team minus the number of black starters in the visiting team. The
race of the coach is taken into account by splitting the sample by the races of both the home and visiting
teams coaches. Alternatively, the proportion of white referees is included as a control variable. In the
rst column, "Black (H), white (V)" indicates that only observations where the coach of the team is black
and the coach of the visiting team is white are included. In the second column, "White (H), black (V)"
indicates that only observations where the coach of the team is white and the coach of the visiting team is
black are included. In the third column, either both coaches are black or both coaches are white. In the
last column, di¤erence in coachesrace is calculated by rst creating a dummy for the coach of each team
(1 if the coach is black) and then subtracting the visiting teams dummy from the home teams. Robust
standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6c. Robustness: Population in Host Location
Probability of beating the spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.022** -0.021**
[0.009] [0.009]
Di¤. in proportion of blacks in the city -0.0001
[0.0001]
Di¤. in proportion of blacks in the state -0.001
[0.001]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes
Observations 16293 16293
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the number
of black starters in the home team minus the number of black starters in the visiting team. The di¤erence
in proportion of blacks in the city (state) is computed by subtracting the percent of black population, as of
2000, in the visiting teams host city (state) from the percent of black population in the home teams host
city (state). Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6d. Robustness: History of Teams
Probability of beating the spread
Di¤erence in black starters -0.021** -0.023** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.009**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.004]
Di¤erence in records 0.033***
[0.007]
Di¤erence in recent games 0.092***
[0.032]
Margin on the teamslast match 0.003***
[0.001]
Spread on the teamslast match 0.0002
[0.003]
Team xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
Season xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
Team-season interactions yes yes yes yes yes
Match xed e¤ects no no no no yes
Observations 16370 16192 15470 14814 16374
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. Di¤erence in black starters is calculated as the
number of black starters in the home team minus the number of black starters in the visiting team. In the
rst column, the di¤erence in records is calculated as the di¤erence between the number of wins the home
team had in a particular season until the game in consideration and the number of wins the visiting team
had in the same season. In the second column, the di¤erence in recent games is calculated as the di¤erence
between the number of wins the home team had in a particular season over the ve previous games before
the game in consideration and the number of wins the visiting team had over the ve previous games. In the
third column, the margin on the teamslast match is computed as the di¤erence between home teams score
and the visiting teams score obtained the last time the two teams played against each other (irrespective
of the location). In the fourth column, the spread on the teamslast match is the point spread quoted on
the last game the two teams faced each other (irrespective of the location and expressed from the home
teams perspective). Note that the margin/spread is equal to the margin/spread from the last match-up
in the previous season when the game in consideration is the rst time the two teams face each other in a
given season. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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